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Abstract 
This paper explores the interaction between upstream firms and downstream firms in a 
two-region general equilibrium model. In many countries, lower tariff rates are set for 
intermediate manufactured goods and higher tariff rates are set for final manufactured 
goods. The derived results imply that such settings of tariff rates tend to preserve a 
symmetric spread of upstream and downstream firms, and continuing tariff reduction may 
cause core-periphery structures. In the case in which the circular causality between 
upstream and downstream firms is focused! as agglomeration forces, the present model is 
fully solved. Thus, we find that (1) the present model displays, at most, three interior steady 
states, (2) when the asymmetric steady-states exist, they are unstable and (3) location 
displays hysteresis when the transport costs of intermediate manufactured goods are 
sufficiently high. 
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1. Introduction
The difference in the tariff rates of products may show that each country intends to promote
local production. Kumagai and Kuroiwa (2009) examined the average effective applied
tariff rate in intra-regional trade in East Asia in 2006. The effective applied rate is the tariff
rate which is actually applied to imported goods from East Asian countries, weighted by the
import value from each country. In Vietnam, Lao PDR, Thailand and Brunei, the tariff rate
on consumption goods is twice the tariff rate on parts and components. In Korea, China,
Malaysia, Indonesia, Taiwan, the Philippines and Myanmar, the tariff rate on consumption
goods is four times as high as the tariff rate on parts and components. This implies that
most countries prefer to maintain higher tariff rates on consumption goods. Furthermore,
these tendencies were clear in the automobile industry as well. To clarify the effects of such
difference in tariff rates not only on local production but also on the spread of economic
activity, a model is needed which includes the transport costs of intermediate goods and the
transport costs of final consumption goods.
Only a small number of papers focus on the agglomeration and dispersion of up-
stream and downstream firms because of the complexity of introducing two types of firms
with increasing returns to scale technologies. The pioneering study of Venables (1996) il-
lustrated figuers to show the interaction of upstream and downstream firms in a two-region
general equilibrium model. Using a two-region general equilibrium model with upstream
and downstream firms and focusing on the agglomeration, Amiti (2005) showed the ten-
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sion between factors in Heckscher-Ohlin model and new economic geography model. To
avoid complexity, Krugman and Venables (1995) developed a two-region general equilib-
rium model with one mass of manufactured products used for intermediary and household
consumption, examined the emergence of the core-periphery structure, and showed the
convergence of real wages between countries with a decrease in the transport cost of the
manufacturing sector. To develop a more analytical model, Ottaviano and Robert-Nicoud
(2006) developed a fully solvable general equilibrium model with one mass of manufac-
tured products. The advance made by Robert-Nicoud (2004) and Ottaviano and Robert-
Nicoud (2006), respectively, was to show that the same key features are shared by the most
prevalent New Economic Geography models, such as Krugman (1991) and Krugman and
Venables (1995) and the models in which firms use unskilled workers as variable costs and
the rest of the inputs as fixed costs. Although we assume that the intermediate goods are
incurred as fixed costs of downstream firms, Ottaviano and Robert-Nicoud (2006) write
that to use intermediate goods in fixed costs is ea (not so) special case.f To realize the same
merits as Ottaviano and Robert-Nicoud (2006) in their analysis on the instability of two
asymmetric steady-states, this chapter extends Ottaviano and Robert-Nicoud (2006) to in-
troduce upstream firms and downstream firms in a model. Such an extension allows us to
obtain solvable results even when upstream firms produce intermediary goods and down-
stream firms produce consumption goods for households in a two-region general equilib-
rium model.
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The spatial configuration of economic activities is decided by the balance of the ag-
glomeration force and dispersion force. The source of agglomeration force is forward and
backward linkages, which bring the circular causality. In our model, there are two circular
causalities: the interaction between upstream firms and downstream firms and the interac-
tion between downstream firms and households. However, it is difficult to focus on two
circular causalities at once; we set a fixed number of skilled workers and allow these work-
ers to earn in the agricultural sector, although such case emerges when the same wage rates
in the manufacturing sector and the agricultural sector. As a result, the mechanism of our
model changes depending on the supply of skilled workers. When the supply of skilled
workers is scarce, all skilled workers are in the manufacturing sector and the wage rates
increase. In this extreme case, this scarcity works as a dispersion force. Only the circular
causality between downstream firms and households causes industrial agglomeration. In
contrast, when the supply of skilled workers is abundant, there are some skilled workers
who are not working in the manufacturing sector. Thus, the regional income in a region
does not change. As a result, only the circular causality between upstream firms and down-
stream firms works. In the followings, only the latter is fully solved.
The remaining portion of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the
model, which is solved in Section 3. Section 4 examines the Pareto dominant allocation.
Section 5 presents the conclusion.
2. Assumptions
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The economic space is composed of two regions, called north and south, which are sym-
metric in terms of tastes, technology and endowments. The economy has two sectors: agri-
culture (herein referred to asA) and manufacturing (herein referred to asM ). The economy
is endowed with two factors of production: entrepreneurs (H) and workers (L).
Workers are not inter-regionally mobile, and regions are endowed with equal supplies
of the immobile factor, L, thus L = L∗ = Lw/2. Some workers (L) are entrepreneurs (H),
who can be regarded as human capital, and regions are also endowed with equal supplies of
entrepreneurs, H , thus H = H∗ = Hw/2. Entrepreneurs are free to choose to utilize their
human capital or not.
Preferences are identical across all workers and are described by the upper tier con-
sisting of a Cobb-Douglas ’nest’ of consumption of the agricultural goods and a composite
of all manufactured consumption goods,
U = CµC
µ
MC
1−µ
A , CM ≡
(∫ m+m∗
i=0
c1−1/σci di
)1/(1−1/σc)
; 0 < µ < 1 < σc (1)
where Cµ ≡ µµ(1 − µ)µ−1 is constant, and CM and CA are, respectively, consumption of
the CES composite of manufactured consumption goods varieties and consumption of A.
Furthermore,m andm∗ are the mass (number) of north and south varieties in manufactured
consumption goods, µ is the expenditure share in industrial varieties, and σc is the constant
elasticity of substitution between the varieties. The corresponding indirect utility functions
for typical northern entrepreneurs and workers are ωH and ω, where
ωH ≡ wH
P µc
, ω ≡ w
P µc
, Pc ≡ (∆c)−1/(σc−1),∆c =
∫ mw
i=0
p1−σci di (2)
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wH is the northern wage for entrepreneurs andwH is the northern wage for workers. Expres-
sions for the corresponding southern values are isomorphic. Below, isomorphic expressions
are omitted.
The agricultural good is homogeneous and produced using workers only. The agri-
cultural sector uses a constant-returns technology under conditions of perfect competition.
The specific cost function is w. Both regions produce an agricultural good. Trade in the
homogeneous A good is costless.
The manufacturing firms are under the condition of monopolistic competition and
use the increasing returns to scale technology. As for the technology of downstream firms,
fixed and marginal input requirements are satisfied by different factors: the marginal cost
is incurred in terms of labor only; the fixed cost is incurred in terms of the differentiated
varieties of the manufactured intermediate goods. In symbols, the cost function of the
typical northern downstream firm l is given by
Cc(cl) = fcPint + acclw,Pint ≡ ∆−1/(σint−1)int ;∆int ≡
∫ nw
k=0
p1−σintintk dk (3)
where ac is the marginal labor requirements in downstream firms, and Pint is the upstream
firm’s price index. Trade in industrial goods is subject to iceberg trade costs; a firm wishing
to sell one unit of its good in the other region must ship τc ≥ 1 units since τc − 1 units melt
in transit.
As for the technology of upstream firms, the marginal cost is also incurred in terms
of labor only, whereas the fixed cost is incurred in terms of one entrepreneur. The cost
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function of the typical northern upstream firm j is given by
Cint(qj) = fintwH + waintqj (4)
where qj is the demand for variety j on intermediate goods. Also, aint is the marginal labor
requirements in upstream firms. Trade in industrial goods is subject to iceberg trade costs;
a firm wishing to sell one unit of its good in the other region must ship τint ≥ 1 units since
τint − 1 units melt in transit.
Because entrepreneurs and workers are free to choose between the agricultural and
manufacturing sectors, the wage rates must be the same in the two sectors within each
region, provided that the two sectors exist and entrepreneurs work in the two sectors in the
given region. Entrepreneurs’ decisions to work as a worker or an entrepreneur are based
on the nominal wage difference. The wage gap between them is expressed as ln (wH/w).
Long-run equilibrium wages for entrepreneursf capital satisfy
ln (wH/w) = 0, n ∈ (0, H¯/fint),
ln (wH/w) > 0, n = H¯/fint, (5)
ln (wH/w) < 0, n = 0.
The flow of upstream firms is expressed as follows:
n˙ = n
(
H¯/fint − n
)
ln
(wH
w
)
, n˙∗ = n∗
(
H¯∗/fint − n∗
)
ln
(
w∗H
w∗
)
. (6)
Downstream firms decide to enter when current profits are positive and exit when they are
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negative. The flow of downstream firms is regulated as follows:
m˙ = m ln
(
pic
Pintfc
)
, m˙∗ = m∗ ln
(
pi∗c
P ∗intfc
)
(7)
where pic and pi∗c are operating profits and Pintfc and P ∗intfc are fixed costs.
3. Instantaneous Equilibrium
The equilibrium taking as a given the spread of manufacturing firms is analyzed.
The agricultural good is costlessly traded between regions and is chosen as the nume´raire,
and thus the price of the agricultural good is one. The equalization of the price of the agri-
cultural good causes the wage for workers to also be one in both regions.
From utility maximization, northern consumption of a variety j is cj = p−σccj (µEc/∆cnw),
where Ec = wHH + w(L − H) is northern expenditure for manufactured consumption
goods. From monopolistic competition, mill prices for all upstream firms are as follow:
pc =
ac
1− (1/σc) , p
∗
c = τc
ac
1− (1/σc) (8)
where pc and p∗c are the consumer prices for a typical north-made variety in the northern
market and the southern market, respectively. Likewise, northern demand of a variety l
of manufactured intermediate goods is ql = pintl(Eint/∆intnw), where Eint = mPintfc is
northern expenditure for manufactured intermediate goods. Mill prices for all downstream
firms are as follow:
pint =
aint
1− (1/σint) , p
∗
int = τint
aint
1− (1/σint) (9)
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where pint and p∗int are the intermediate manufactured goods prices for a typical north-made
variety in the northern market and the southern market, respectively.
Using the demand functions and mill prices, the profit function for downstream firms
(Πc and Π∗c) are as follow:
Πc =
µ
σc
(
Ec
∆c
+ φc
E∗c
∆∗c
)
− (∆int)−
1
σint−1 fc, (10)
Π∗c =
µ
σc
(
φc
Ec
∆c
+
E∗c
∆∗c
)
− (∆∗int)−
1
σint−1 fc; (11)
φc ≡ τ 1−σcc , φint ≡ τ 1−σintint (12)
Ec ≡ w(L−H) + wHH, E∗c ≡ w∗(L∗ −H∗) + w∗HH∗, (13)
∆c ≡ m
(
ac
1− (1/σc)
)1−σc
+ φcm
∗
(
ac
1− (1/σc)
)1−σc
, (14)
∆∗c ≡ φcm
(
ac
1− (1/σc)
)1−σc
+m∗
(
ac
1− (1/σc)
)1−σc
, (15)
∆int ≡ n
(
aint
1− (1/σint)
)1−σint
+ φintn
∗
(
aint
1− (1/σint)
)1−σint
, (16)
∆∗int ≡ φintn
(
aint
1− (1/σint)
)1−σint
+ n∗
(
aint
1− (1/σint)
)1−σint
. (17)
The value of φc and φint, respectively, ranges from φc = 0 and φint = 0, with prohibitive
trade costs to φc = 1 and φint = 1, with zero trade costs.
Using the demand functions, mill prices, and the zero profit condition of downstream
firms, the profit functions for upstream firms (Πint and Π∗int) are expressed as follow:
Πint =
µ
σintσc
(
m
∆int
(
Ec
∆c
+
φcE∗c
∆∗c
)
+
m∗φint
∆∗int
(
φcEc
∆c
+
E∗c
∆∗c
))
− wHfint, (18)
Π∗int =
µ
σintσc
(
mφint
∆int
(
Ec
∆c
+
φcE∗c
∆∗c
)
+
m∗
∆∗int
(
φcEc
∆c
+
E∗c
∆∗c
))
− w∗Hfint. (19)
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Therefore, the zero profit condition of upstream firms implies that the nominal wage rates
for entrepreneurs are:
wH =
(&B&C −&A&D)(L−H)H∗ +&A(L−H)b+&B(L∗ −H∗)b
(&A&D −&B&C)HH∗ − b(&AH +&DH∗) + b2 , (20)
w∗H =
(&B&C −&A&D)(L∗ −H∗)H +&C(L−H)b+&D(L∗ −H∗)b
(&A&D −&B&C)HH∗ − b(&AH +&DH∗) + b2 (21)
where
b ≡ fintσcσint/µ,
&A ≡ m
∆int∆c
+
m∗φintφc
∆∗int∆c
, &B ≡ mφc
∆int∆∗c
+
m∗φint
∆∗int∆∗c
,
&C ≡ mφint
∆int∆c
+
m∗φc
∆∗int∆c
, &D ≡ mφintφc
∆int∆∗c
+
m∗
∆∗int∆∗c
.
We make the usual choice of units for lightening the following analysis. We normal-
ize ac to 1− (1/σc), aint to 1− (1/σint), fc to one, and fint to one.
4. Equilibrium
4.1. Agglomeration and Dispersion
The equilibrium resulting from the free choice between the agricultural sector and manu-
facturing firms is analyzed in ten cases. As Baldwin (2001) used, local stability is evaluated
by linearizing (6) and (7) around an equilibrium point m¯, m¯∗, n¯, n¯∗. The elements of the
Jacobian matrix can be expressed as in Appendix 1. From Hatman-Grobman theorem (see
Hartman 1964: 244, Theorem 7.1), which shows that linearization preserves the qualitative
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properties of the nonlinear system in the neighborhood of the equilibrium point when no
eigenvalue of the Jacobian matrix has real parts equal to zero, equilibrium is stable when
the Jacobian matrix has eigenvalues all with negative real parts.
Agglomeration and abundant supply of entrepreneurs
The manufacturing sector is supposed to be concentrated in the north, with n∗ = m∗ = 0.
Since entrepreneurs are abundant, some entrepreneurs are in the agricultural sector in the
north. All entrepreneurs in the south are also in the agricultural sector. Thus, the wage rate
of entrepreneurs is one in both regions. Setting m¯∗ = n¯∗ = H∗ = 0 and using (10) and
(20), the zero profit condition of downstream firms and the equality of wage rates between
workers and entrepreneurs implies the following number of upstream firms and downstream
firms in the core:
m =
µ
σc
(2L)
σint
σint−1 b−
1
σint−1 ≡ m1, n = H = 2L
b
, (22)
and the operating profits and fixed costs for upstream firms and the wage rate for en-
trepreneurs are as follow.
pic =
µ
σc
2L
m
, Pint = n
− 1σint−1 , wH =
2L/n− 1
b− 1 . (23)
Because the entrepreneurs are abundant, we have 2L/b < H¯ .
Examining the instance when all eigenvalues are negative in the above setting as in
Appendix B.1, we find that the case when all manufacturing firms are in the north under
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2L/b < H¯ is a spatial equilibrium under the following condition:
1
2
(φc + 1/φc) < φint
− 1σint−1 . (24)
The condition (24) shows the case when downstream firms do not emerge in the periphery.
This implies that agglomeration is sustainable whenever transport costs of intermediate
goods are high enough and transport costs of final goods are low enough. As explained in
Fujita et al. (1999: 249), the right-hand side of the inequality shows the forward linkages
between upstream firms and downstream firms. That is, downstream firms need to bear
a disadvantage to operate in the region where there are no upstream firms. On the other
hand, the left-hand side of the inequality shows the backward linkages between downstream
firms and households. The first term in the parenthesis shows that downstream firms have a
disadvantage when transporting to the other region, and the second term in the parenthesis
shows that transport costs moderate price competition in the periphery.
—————————————————————
Insert Figure 1 around here
—————————————————————
To understand the relation with the results of the standard core-periphery model,
Figure 1 is helpful. The condition (24) is depicted as a curve in Figure 1. The core-periphery
structure is sustainable in the domain under the curve. The diagonal line shows the pair of
transport costs when both transport costs take the same value. Supposing that both transport
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costs fall along the diagonal line from the origin of Figure 1, the core-periphery pattern
becomes stable after transport costs decrease adequately, as discussed in Fujita et al. (1999).
Agglomeration and scarce supply of entrepreneurs
The manufacturing sector is supposed to be concentrated in the north, with n∗ = m∗ = 0.
Since entrepreneurs are scarce, the number of upstream firms is decided by the number of
entrepreneurs in the north. All entrepreneurs in the south are in the agricultural sector. Set-
ting m¯∗ = n¯∗ = H∗ = 0 and using (10) and (20), the zero profit condition of downstream
firms and the scarcity of entrepreneurs implies the following number of upstream firms and
downstream firms in the core:
m =
µ
σc
b
b− 1(2L− H¯)H¯
1
σint−1 ≡ m2, n = H¯, (25)
and the operating profits and fixed costs for upstream firms, and wage rate for entrepreneurs,
are as follows
pic =
µ
σc
(2L− H¯)b
(b− 1)m , Pint = n
− 1σint−1 , wH =
2L− H¯
(b− 1)H¯ . (26)
Examining the instance when all eigenvalues are negative in the above setting as in
Appendix B.2., we find that the case when all manufacturing firms are in the north under
2L/b ≥ H¯ is a spatial equilibrium under the following condition:
φint <
(b− 1)H¯
2L− H¯ , (27)
and
φc[(b+ 1)L− bH¯] + (b− 1)L/φc
b(2L− H¯) < φint
− 1σint−1 . (28)
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The first condition (27) shows the case when upstream firms do not emerge in the periphery.
The right-hand side of (27) is the nominal wage rate of entrepreneurs in the south (the
periphery) divided by that of entrepreneurs in the north (the core). That is, upstream firms
emerge in the periphery when transport costs are low enough that the decrease in profit
caused by the additional transport cost can be covered by the increase in profit due to the
relatively lower nominal wage rates of entrepreneurs in the periphery. The second condition
(28) is similar to (24). The minor difference in them stems from the asymmetric market size
in (28). In Figure 2, (27) is depicted as a horizontal line, whereas (28) is depicted as a curve.
As in Figure 1, the diagonal line shows the pairs of transport costs when both transport costs
take the same value. Supposing that both transport costs fall along the diagonal line from the
origin of Figure 1, the core-periphery pattern becomes stable after transport costs decrease
adequately because downstream firms lose the incentive to emerge in the periphery. Further
decrease in transport costs causes the emergence of upstream firms in the periphery.
—————————————————————
Insert Figure 2 around here
—————————————————————
Dispersion and abundant supply of entrepreneurs
The manufacturing sector is supposed to be spread symmetrically, with n = n∗ and m =
m∗. Since entrepreneurs are abundant, some entrepreneurs are in the agricultural sector in
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both regions. Thus, the wage rate of entrepreneurs is one in both regions. The zero profit
condition for upstream firms implies that wH = (L−H)/(b− 1)H . Since wH is one when
entrepreneurs are abundant, the number of upstream firms in a region is n = H = L/b,
which implies L/b < H¯ , whereas the number of downstream firms in a region is
m =
µ
σc
(
1 + φint
b
)1/(σint−1)
Lσint/(σint−1) ≡ m3. (29)
Examining the instance when all eigenvalues are negative in the above setting in Appendix
B.3, we find that the case when upstream firms and downstream firms spread symmetrically
under L/b < H¯ is spatial equilibrium under the following condition:
(1− φc)2 − 4φc
(σint − 1) > 0. (30)
The first and the second term on the left-hand side of (30), respectively, show dispersion
force and agglomeration force. When the first term is larger than the second, a symmetric
pattern of firms exists. The first term is the effects from an upstream firm on other upstream
firms and those from a downstream firm on other downstream firms, whereas the second
term is the effects from an upstream firm on downstream firms and those from a downstream
firm on upstream firms. Surprisingly, transport costs for intermediate goods are not related
to the stability of the symmetric pattern. This is because the effects of transport costs on
both forces are the same and so are canceled out from (30). From (30), the dispersion force
decreases with the fall of the transport costs, whereas agglomeration forces increase with
the rise of transport costs. Thus, the symmetric pattern is stable when φc ∈ (0,φsc), where
57
φsc is defined from (30) as
φsc =
√
σint − 1√
σint + 1
.
As intermediate goods becomemore substitutable, the agglomeration forces become weaker.
As ∂φsc/σint is always positive, an increase in substitutable intermediate goods causes a
larger φsc.
Dispersion and scarce supply of entrepreneurs
The manufacturing sector is supposed to be spread symmetrically, with n = n∗ and m =
m∗. Since entrepreneurs are scarce, the number of upstream firms is decided by the number
of entrepreneurs in both regions. The zero profit condition for upstream firms implies that
wH = (L− H¯)/(b− 1)H¯ and w∗H = (L− H¯∗)/(b− 1)H¯∗. Since entrepreneurs are scarce,
the number of upstream firms in a region is n = n∗ = H¯ . Since we consider the case in
which wH ≥ 1, we have L/b ≥ H¯ . The zero profit condition for downstream firms implies
the following number of downstream firms in a region:
m =
µ
σc
(L− H¯)H¯ 1σint−1 (1 + φint)
1
σint−1 ≡ m4. (31)
Examining the instance when all eigenvalues are negative in the above setting in Appendix
B.4, we find that the case when upstream firms and downstream firms spread symmetrically
under L/b ≥ H¯ is always a spatial equilibrium.
As an agglomeration force, circular causality exists between entrepreneurs and final
manufactured goods. That is, the increase in downstream firms raises wage rates for en-
trepreneurs; the rise in wage rates for entrepreneurs provides a larger demand for final man-
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ufactured goods. However, these agglomeration forces are surpassed by dispersion forces
which emerge from the harsh price competition among downstream firms. The other ag-
glomeration forces engendered by the interaction between downstream firms and upstream
firms do not exert an effect due to the lack of additional entrepreneurs.
Two agglomerations by one type of firm and abundant supply of entrepreneurs
Upstream firms are supposed to exist only in a region with m∗ = 0, whereas downstream
firms are supposed to exist only in the other region with n = 0. Since entrepreneurs are
abundant, some entrepreneurs are in the agricultural sector in both regions. Examining the
instance when all eigenvalues are negative in the above setting as in Appendix B.5, we find
that the case in which all upstream firms are in one region and all downstream firms are
in the other region under 2L/b < H¯ is not a spatial equilibrium. This is because, due to
the positive transport costs for intermediate goods, downstream firms emerge in the region
where all downstream firms locate to save on transport costs for intermediate goods, and
furthermore, upstream firms emerge in the region where all upstream firms locate.
Two agglomerations by one type of firms and scarce supply of entrepreneurs
Upstream firms are supposed to exist only in a region with m∗ = 0, whereas downstream
firms are supposed to exist only in the other region with n = 0. Since entrepreneurs are
scarce, the number of upstream firms is decided by the number of entrepreneurs in a re-
gion. Examining the instance when all eigenvalues are negative in the above setting as in
Appendix B.6, we find that the case in which all upstream firms are in one region and all
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downstream firms are in the other region under 2L/b ≥ H¯ is not a spatial equilibrium.
Agglomeration of upstream firms, dispersion of downstream firms,
and abundant supply of entrepreneurs
Upstream firms are supposed to be located in a region, and downstream firms are supposed
to be located symmetrically. This means n > 0, n∗ = 0 and m = m∗. Since entrepreneurs
are abundant, some entrepreneurs are in the agricultural sector in both regions. Examining
the instance when all eigenvalues are negative in the above setting as in Appendix B.7, we
find that the case in which upstream firms locate only in a region and downstream firms
spread evenly under 2L/b < H¯ is not a spatial equilibrium. In this configuration of firms,
downstream firms have an incentive to emerge in the region where downstream firms do not
locate because the wage rates for entrepreneurs are always higher than that for workers.
Agglomeration of upstream firms, dispersion of downstream firms, and scarce supply of
entrepreneurs
Downstream firms are supposed to exist only in a region with n∗ = 0, whereas upstream
firms are supposed to spread evenly into the two regions withm = m∗. Since entrepreneurs
are scarce, the number of upstream firms is decided by the number of entrepreneurs in a
region. Examining the instance when all eigenvalues are negative in the above setting as in
Appendix B.8, we find that the case in which upstream firms disperse symmetrically and
all downstream firms are in a region under 2L/b ≥ H¯ is not a spatial equilibrium.
Dispersion of upstream firms, agglomeration of downstream firms, and abundant supply
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of entrepreneurs
Upstream firms are supposed to be located symmetrically, and downstream firms are sup-
posed to be located only in a region. That means m > 0, m∗ = 0 and n = n∗. Since
entrepreneurs are abundant, some entrepreneurs are in the agricultural sector in both re-
gions. Examining the instance when all eigenvalues are negative in the above setting as
in Appendix B.9, we find that the case in which upstream firms locate symmetrically and
downstream firms locate only in a region with wH = 1 is not a spatial equilibrium. This
is because downstream firms always have an incentive to emerge in the region where there
are no downstream firms.
Dispersion of upstream firms, agglomeration of downstream firms, and scarce supply of
entrepreneurs
Upstream firms are supposed to exist only in a region with m∗ = 0, whereas downstream
firms are supposed to spread evenly into the two regions with n = n∗. Since entrepreneurs
are scarce, the number of upstream firms is decided by the number of entrepreneurs in both
regions. Examining the instance when all eigenvalues are negative in the above setting as
in Appendix B.10, we find that the case in which all upstream firms are in one region and
downstream firms disperse symmetrically with wH ≥ 1 is not a spatial equilibrium.
4.2. Partial Agglomeration
Here, we start to examine the interior solutions, which refer to the solutions without ag-
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glomeration by any firms and which are associated with uneven distribution of firms. To
this aim, we rewrite the entire system in terms of ratios, in keeping with the method used in
Robert-Nicoud (2004).
We define ∆˜c and ∆˜int as
∆˜c ≡ ∆c
∆∗c
=
m+ φcm∗
φcm+m∗
(32)
∆˜int ≡ ∆int
∆∗int
=
n+ φintn∗
φintn+ n∗
(33)
Solving (32) and (33), we have
m
m∗
=
φc − ∆˜c
∆˜cφc − 1
(34)
n
n∗
=
φint − ∆˜int
∆˜intφint − 1
(35)
We can easily verify that functions (34) and (35) are bijectional, using (32) and (33), and
are, respectively, continuous between φc < ∆˜c < 1/φc and between φint < ∆˜int < 1/φint.
To clarify the interaction between upstream firms and downstream firms, we focus
on the case in which all entrepreneurs receive the same wage rates as workers in agricul-
tural sector. That is, the regional income becomes the same in the two regions. In this
case, mobile expenditure by downstream firms is defined as the ratio of the mobile regional
expenditure of downstream firms in Region 1 to the mobile regional expenditure of down-
stream firms in Region 2, ηint as follows:
ηint ≡ m
m∗
1 + φc∆˜c
φc + ∆˜c
(36)
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Substituting (34) into (36), we have
ηint =
φc − ∆˜c
∆˜cφc − 1
1 + φc∆˜c
φc + ∆˜c
(37)
From the zero profit condition of upstream firms, we have as follows:
ln
(
ηint/∆˜int + φint
ηintφint/∆˜int + 1
)
= 0; . (38)
Thus, we have ηint = ∆˜int. Similarly, from the zero profit condition of downstream firms,
we have as follows:
ln
(
1 + φc∆˜c
φc + ∆˜c
)
= − 1
σint − 1 ln
(
∆˜int
)
(39)
Substituting the right-hand side of (39) into (37) and using ηint = ∆˜int, we have
ln(∆˜int) =
σint − 1
σint
ln
(
φc − ∆˜c
∆˜cφc − 1
)
(40)
Since ∂∆˜int/∂∆˜c > 0 in (40), we find that there exists no partial agglomeration when
0 < m/m∗ < 0.5 and 0.5 < n/n∗ < 1 and when 0.5 < m/m∗ < 1 and 0 < n/n∗ < 0.5.
Using ηint = ∆˜int and substituting (37) into (39), we have
−σint ln
(
1 + φc∆˜c
φc + ∆˜c
)
− ln
(
φc − ∆˜c
φc∆˜c − 1
)
= 0 (41)
The function always becomes zero when ∆˜c = 1. Thus, there exists an equilibrium in the
symmetric case. The first derivative of (41) with ∆˜c has two zeros when the symmetric
pattern is stable and one zero when transport costs of final goods are at the threshold value
such that the symmetric pattern is stable or not, φc = φsc. The first derivative of (41) with
∆˜c has no zero when the symmetric pattern is unstable. Thus, there exist two unstable
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asymmetric equilibriums at most, which are regarded as two partial agglomerations. On the
core-periphery structure, setting ∆˜c = φc and ˜Deltaint = φint in (39), we find the condition
in which core-periphery patterns become a spatial equilibriumwhen the left-hand side of the
derived equation becomes smaller than the right-hand side of the derived equation. Thus,
substituting ∆˜c = φc, ∆˜int = φint and then φc = φsc into the inequality, which is related
with (39), we have a condition in which the core-periphery structure is sustainable when
φc = φsc is an equilibrium as follows:
0 < φint <
(
σint − 1
σint + 1
)σint−1
≡ φhint. (42)
This implies that location displays hysteresis when the transport costs of intermediate goods
are high enough.
To summarize the result of the present section:
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium). When 0 < H¯/L < 1/b, symmetric equilibrium exists and is
stable when φc ∈ (0, 1) and φint ∈ (0, 1). Two core-periphery equilibriums are stable when
the following conditions are satisfied:
φint < min
{
(b− 1)H¯
2L− H¯ ,
{
φc[(b+ 1)L− bH¯] + (b− 1)L/φc
b(2L− H¯)
}−(σint−1)}
(43)
When 1/b < H¯/L < 2/b or 1/b < H¯/L < 1 under b < 2, symmetric equilibrium exists
and is stable when φc ∈ (0,φsc). Two core-periphery equilibriums exist and are stable
when (43) is satisfied. When 2/b < H¯/L < 1, the model displays at most three interior
equilibriums. Symmetric equilibrium exists and is stable when φc ∈ (0,φsc) and φint ∈
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(0, 1). When two partial agglomerations exist, symmetric equilibrium exists and these two
partial agglomerations are unstable. Location displays hysteresis when 0 < φint < φhint.
Two core-periphery equilibriums are stable when the following conditions are satisfied:
φint <
[
φc + 1/φc
2
]−(σint−1)
. (44)
5.Pareto Dominant Allocation
In the previous section, we found that spatial equilibriums exist in the core-periphery pat-
tern and symmetric pattern depending on the size of H¯/L. Thus, we can focus only on
these patterns as spatial equilibriums when examining the Pareto dominant allocation. We
evaluate the indirect utility level of workers and entrepreneurs in the two regions.
When 0 < H¯/L < 1/b, the indirect utility level of entrepreneurs in the core under the
core-periphery structure (V A1CH) in terms of the indirect utility level of entrepreneurs under
the symmetric pattern (V S1H ) is expressed as follows:
V A1CH
V S1H
=
[
2L− H¯
L− H¯
]1+ µσc−1 [ 1
(1 + φc)(1 + φint)
1
σint−1
] µ
σc−1
. (45)
The indirect utility level of entrepreneurs in the periphery under the core-periphery structure
(V S1H ) in terms of indirect utility level of entrepreneurs under the symmetric pattern (V S1H )
is expressed as follows:
V A1P
V S1H
=
(b− 1)H¯
L− H¯
[
φc
1 + φc
2L− H¯
L− H¯
1
(1 + φint)
1
σint−1
] µ
σc−1
. (46)
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The indirect utility level of workers in the core under the core-periphery structure (V A1C )
in terms of indirect utility level of entrepreneurs under the symmetric pattern (V S1H ) is ex-
pressed as follows:
V A1C
V S1
=
[
1
1 + φc
2L− H¯
L− H¯
1
(1 + φint)
1
σint−1
] µ
σc−1
(47)
The indirect utility level of workers in the periphery under the core-periphery structure
(V A1P ) in terms of indirect utility level of entrepreneurs under the symmetric pattern (V S1H )
is expressed as follows:
V A1P
V S1
=
[
φc
1 + φc
2L− H¯
L− H¯
1
(1 + φint)
1
σint−1
] µ
σc−1
(48)
We now find the following relations:
V A1CH
V S1H
>
V A1C
V S1
>
V A1P
V S1
>
V A1P
V S1H
(49)
Focusing on when V A1P /V S1H < 1 is satisfied to examine the Pareto dominant allocation, we
find from (46) that agglomeration Pareto-dominates dispersion if trade costs of final goods
are lower than the following level:
φc =
[
L−H¯
(b−1)H¯
]σc−1
µ
2L−H¯
L−H¯ (1 + φint)
− 1(σint−1) −
[
L−H¯
(b−1)H¯
]σc−1
µ
≡ φPareto1c . (50)
When 1/b < H¯/L < 2/b or 1/b < H¯/L < 1 under b < 2, the indirect utility level
of entrepreneurs in the core under the core-periphery structure (V A2CH) in terms of indirect
utility level under the symmetric pattern (V S2) is expressed as follows:
V A2CH
V S2
=
[
2L− H¯
(b− 1)H¯
]1+ µσc+1 [ b
LH¯
] σintµ
(σint−1)(σc−1)
[
1
(1 + φc)(1 + φint)
1
σint−1
] µ
σc−1
(51)
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The indirect utility level in the core under the core-periphery structure (V A2C ) in terms of
indirect utility level under the symmetric pattern (V S2) is expressed as follows:
V A2c
V S2
=
[
2L− H¯
(b− 1)H¯
1
(1 + φc)(1 + φint)
1
σint−1
(
b
H¯L
) σint
σint−1
] µ
σc−1
(52)
The indirect utility level in the periphery under the core-periphery structure (V A2P ) in terms
of indirect utility level under the symmetric pattern (V S2) is expressed as follows:
V A2P
V S2
=
[
2L− H¯
(b− 1)H¯
φc
(1 + φc)(1 + φint)
1
σint−1
(
b
H¯L
) σint
σint−1
] µ
σc−1
(53)
From the above equations, we find the following relation:
V A2CH
V S2
>
V A2c
V S2
>
V A2P
V S2
(54)
To examine the Pareto dominant allocation from (53), we find that agglomeration Pareto-
dominates dispersion if trade costs of final goods are lower than the following level:
φc =
[
2L− H¯
(b− 1)H¯
(
b
H¯L
) σint
σint−1 1
(1 + φint)
1
σint−1
− 1
]−1
≡ φPareto2c . (55)
When 2/b < H¯/L < 1, the indirect utility level in the core under the core-periphery
structure (V A3C ) in terms of indirect utility level under the symmetric pattern (V S3) is ex-
pressed as follows:
V A3c
V S3
=
[
2
σint
σint−1
(1 + φc)(1 + φint)
1
σint−1
] µ
σc−1
. (56)
We easily find that V A3c /V S3 > 1. The indirect utility level in the periphery under the
core-periphery structure (V A3P ) in terms of indirect utility level under the symmetric pattern
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(V S3) is expressed as follows:
V A3P
V S3
=
[
φc2
σint
σint−1
(1 + φc)(1 + φint)
1
σint−1
] µ
σc−1
(57)
From the above equations, we find the following relation:
V A3c
V S3
>
V A3P
V S3
(58)
From (57), we find that agglomeration Pareto-dominates dispersion if trade costs of final
goods are lower than the following level:
φc =
[
2
σint
σint−1
(1 + φint)1/(σint−1)
]−1
≡ φPareto3c (59)
To summarize:
Proposition 2 (Pareto Dominant Allocation) Agglomeration Pareto-dominates dispersion if
trade costs are low (φc > φPareto1c when 0 < H¯/L < 1/b, φc > φPareto2c when 1/b <
H¯/L < 2/b or 1/b < H¯/L < 1 under b < 2, and φc > φPareto3c when 2/b < H¯/L < 1).
This result is the same as what has been established by Ottaviano and Robert-Nicoud
(2006).
6.Conclusion
In many countries, lower tariff rates are set for intermediate manufactured goods, and higher
tariff rates are set for final manufactured goods. The derived results imply that such setting
of tariff rates tends to preserve the symmetric spread of upstream and downstream firms,
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and continued tariff reduction may cause core-periphery structures. When we focus on the
interaction between upstream and downstream firms, the present model is fully solved. This
means that (1) the present model displays, at most, three interior steady states, (2) when
the asymmetric steady-states exist, they are unstable and (3) location displays hysteresis
when the transport costs of intermediate goods are sufficiently high. Because this model
is adequately simple to be used as an engine of larger models, new extensions will further
develop the potential of New Economic Geography.
69
References
Amiti, Mary. 2005. Location of vertically linked industries: agglomeration versus compar-
ative advantage. European Economic Review 49: 809-832.
Baldwin, Richard E. 2001. The core-periphery model with forward-looking expectations.
Regional Science and Urban Economics 31: 21-49.
Fujita, M., P. R. Krugman and A. J. Venables. 1999. The Spatial Economy: Cities, Regions,
and International Trade. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Hartman, Philipe. 1964. Ordinary Differential Equations. The Jones Hopkins University.
Baltimore, Maryland.
Krugman, P. R. and A. J. Venables. 1996. Globalizations and Inequality of nations. Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 110:857-80.
Kumagai, S. and I. Kuroiwa. 2009. A history of de facto economic integration in East Asia.
in Fujita, M., I. Kuroiwa, and S. Kumagai ed. Economics of East Asian Integration
mimeo
Ottaviano, Gianmarco I. P. and F. Robert-Nicoud. 2006. The ‘genome’ of NEGmodels with
vertical linkages: a positive and normative synthesis. Journal of Economic Geography
6: 113-139.
Robert-Nicoud, F. 2005. The structure of simple ’New Economic Geography’ models (Or,
on identical twins). Journal of Economic Geograph 5(2): 201-34.
Venables, Anthony J. 1996. Equilibrium locations of vertically linked industries. Interna-
70
tional Economic Review Vol 37,No.2: 341-359.
71
Appendix A
The elements of the Jacobian matrix aij are as follow:
a11 = m¯
∂ ln( picPint )
∂m
+ ln(
pic
Pint
)
a12 = m¯
∂ ln( picPint )
∂m∗
a13 = m¯
∂ ln( picPint )
∂n
a14 = m¯
∂ ln( picPint )
∂n∗
a21 = m¯∗
∂ ln( pi
∗
c
P ∗int
)
∂m
a21 = m¯∗
∂ ln( pi
∗
c
P ∗int
)
∂m∗
+ ln(
pi∗c
P ∗int
)
a21 = m¯∗
∂ ln( pi
∗
c
P ∗int
)
∂n
a21 = m¯∗
∂ ln( pi
∗
c
P ∗int
)
∂n∗
a31 = n¯(H¯ − n¯)∂ ln(wH/w)
∂m
a32 = n¯(H¯ − n¯)∂ ln(wH/w)
∂m∗
a33 = n¯(H¯ − n¯)∂ ln(wH/w)
∂n
+ (H¯ − 2n¯) ln(wH/w)
a34 = n¯(H¯ − n¯)∂ ln(wH/w)
∂n∗
a41 = n¯∗(H¯∗ − n¯∗)∂ ln(w
∗
H/w
∗)
∂m
a42 = n¯∗(H¯∗ − n¯∗)∂ ln(w
∗
H/w
∗)
∂m∗
a43 = n¯∗(H¯∗ − n¯∗)∂ ln(w
∗
H/w
∗)
∂n
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a44 = n¯∗(H¯∗ − n¯∗)∂ ln(w
∗
H/w
∗)
∂n∗
+ (H¯∗ − 2n¯∗) ln(w∗H/w∗)
Appendix B
B.1.
From pic/Pint = 1 and wH/w = 1, setting m¯∗ = n¯∗ = H∗ = 0 and (22) and using
Appendix A, we have the following Jacobian matrix:
J =

m¯
∂ ln(pic/Pint)
∂m
m¯
∂ ln(pic/Pint)
∂m∗
m¯
∂ ln(pic/Pint)
∂n
m¯
∂ ln(pic/Pint)
∂n∗
0 ln(pi∗c/P
∗
int) 0 0
nˆ
∂ ln(wH/w)
∂m
nˆ
∂ ln(wH/w)
∂m∗
nˆ
∂ ln(wH/w)
∂n
nˆ
∂ ln(wH/w)
∂n∗
0 0 0 H¯ ln(w∗H/w
∗)

(60)
where nˆ ≡ n¯(H¯− n¯). Using (23) and the above Jacobian matrix, the characteristic equation
of the system can be written as
(
λ− H¯ ln(w
∗
H
w∗
)
)(
λ− ln( pi
∗
c
P ∗int
)
)(
λ+ 1
)(
λ+ (H¯ − n¯) 2L
2L− n¯
)
= 0. (61)
From the Hartman-Gobman theorem, the preservation of qualitative properties of the non-
linear system in the neighbourhood of the equilibrium point is assured when the eigenvalue
of the Jacobian matrix does not has zero or purely imaginary eigenvalues. Also, Routh-
Hurwitz theorem shows that the necessary and sufficient condition for the stability of linear
differential equations is when the real part of the eigenvalues of coefficient matrices is neg-
ative. Since w∗ is one, the system become stable when w∗H < 1 and pi∗c − P ∗int < 0. Using
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(11) and H = 2L/b, the first requirement is met when φint < 1, whereas, using (21), the
second requirement is met when (24) is satisfied.
B.2.
From pic/Pint = 1 and n = H¯ , setting m¯∗ = n¯∗ = H∗ = 0 and (22), and using Appendix
A, we have the following Jacobian matrix:
J =

m¯
∂ ln(pic/Pint)
∂m
m¯
∂ ln(pic/Pint)
∂m∗
m¯
∂ ln(pic/Pint)
∂n
m¯
∂ ln(pic/Pint)
∂n∗
0 ln( pi
∗
c
P ∗int
) 0 0
0 0 −H¯ ln(wH/w) 0
0 0 0 H¯ ln(w∗H/w
∗)

. (62)
Using (26) and the above Jacobian matrix, the characteristic equation of the system can be
written as
(
λ− H¯ ln(w
∗
H
w∗
)
)(
λ− ln( pi
∗
c
P ∗int
)
)(
λ+ 1
)(
λ+ H¯ ln
(
2L− H¯
(b− 1)H¯
))
= 0. (63)
Thus, since w∗ is one, the system is stable when w∗H < 1 and pi∗c −P ∗int < 0. Using (11), the
first requirement is met when (27) is satisfied, whereas using (21), the second requirement
is met when (28) is satisfied.
B.3.
From pic/Pint = pi∗c/P ∗int = 1 and wH/w = w∗H/w∗ = 1, using Appendix A, the Jacobian
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matrix can be written as
m¯
∂ ln(pic/Pint)
∂m
m¯
∂ ln(pic/Pint)
∂m∗
m¯
∂ ln(pic/Pint)
∂n
m¯
∂ ln(pic/Pint)
∂n∗
m¯∗
∂ ln(pi∗c/P
∗
int)
∂m
m¯∗
∂ ln(pi∗c/P
∗
int)
∂m∗
m¯∗
∂ ln(pi∗c/P
∗
int)
∂n
m¯∗
∂ ln(pi∗c/P
∗
int)
∂n∗
nˆ
∂ ln(wH/w)
∂m
nˆ
∂ ln(wH/w)
∂m∗
nˆ
∂ ln(wH/w)
∂n
nˆ
∂ ln(wH/w)
∂n∗
nˆ∗
∂ ln(w∗H/w
∗)
∂m
nˆ∗
∂ ln(w∗H/w
∗)
∂m∗
nˆ∗
∂ ln(w∗H/w
∗)
∂n
nˆ∗
∂ ln(w∗H/w
∗)
∂n∗

. (64)
The elements of the Jacobian matrix are derived from (10), (11), (20) and (21) as follows:
∂ ln(pic/Pint)
∂m
=
∂ ln(pi∗c/P
∗
int)
∂m∗
= − (1 + φ
2
c)
m¯(1 + φc)2
, (65)
∂ ln(pic/Pint)
∂m∗
=
∂ ln(pi∗c/P
∗
int)
∂m
= − 2φc
m¯(1 + φc)2
(66)
∂ ln(pic/Pint)
∂n
=
∂ ln(pi∗c/P
∗
int)
∂n∗
=
1
n¯(σint − 1)(1 + φint) , (67)
∂ ln(pic/Pint)
∂n∗
=
∂ ln(pi∗c/P
∗
int)
∂n
=
φint
n¯(σint − 1)(1 + φint) , (68)
∂ ln(wH/w)
∂m
=
∂ ln(w∗H/w
∗)
∂m∗
= −∂ ln(wH/w)
∂m∗
= −∂ ln(w
∗
H/w
∗)
∂m
=
2L
b− Z
φc(1− φint)
(1 + φc)2(1 + φint)n¯2m¯
, (69)
∂ ln(wH/w)
∂n
=
∂ ln(w∗H/w
∗)
∂n∗
= −b
2[b(1 + φc)(1 + φ2int)− (1− φint)(1− φintφc)]
L(b− Z)(b− 1)(1 + φc)(1 + φint)2 ,
(70)
∂ ln(wH/w)
∂n∗
=
∂ ln(w∗H/w
∗)
∂n
= −b
2[2bφint(1 + φc)− (1− φint)(φc − φint)]
L(b− Z)(b− 1)(1 + φc)(1 + φint)2 , (71)
where Z ≡ (1−φc)(1−φint)/[(1+φc)(1+φint)]. The characteristic equation of the system
can be written as
(λ+ 1/m¯)
(
λ+
b3(1 + φint)2 − b2(1− φint)2
L(b− Z)(b− 1)(1 + φint)2
)
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×
{
λ2 +
(
(1− φc)2
m¯(1 + φc)2
+
b2(1− φint)2
(b− Z)(1 + φint)2L
)
λ
+
b2(1− φint)2[(1− φc)2 − 4φc(σint−1) ]
m¯(b− Z)(1 + φc)2(1 + φint)2L
}
= 0. (72)
The eigenvalues except in the last bracket are always negative. For the eigenvalue in the
last bracket to be negative, the last term must be positive. Thus, this system is stable when
(30) is met.
B.4.
From pic/Pint = pi∗c/P ∗int = 1 and wH/w = w∗H/w∗ = 1, using Appendix A, the Jacobian
matrix can be written as
m¯
∂ ln(pic/Pint)
∂m
m¯
∂ ln(pic/Pint)
∂m∗
m¯
∂ ln(pic/Pint)
∂n
m¯
∂ ln(pic/Pint)
∂n∗
m¯∗
∂ ln(pi∗c/P
∗
int)
∂m
m¯∗
∂ ln(pi∗c/P
∗
int)
∂m∗
m¯∗
∂ ln(pi∗c/P
∗
int)
∂n
m¯∗
∂ ln(pi∗c/P
∗
int)
∂n∗
0 0 −Hˆ ln(wH/w) 0
0 0 0 −Hˆ∗ ln(w∗H/w∗)

. (73)
The characteristic equation of the system can be written as
(
λ+ H¯ ln(
wH
w
)
)(
λ+ H¯∗ ln(
w∗H
w∗
)
)
×{
λ2 − 2∂ ln(pic/Pint)
∂m
λ
+
[
∂ ln(pic/Pint)
∂m
− ∂ ln(pic/Pint)
∂m∗
] [
∂ ln(pic/Pint)
∂m
+
∂ ln(pic/Pint)
∂m∗
]}
= 0. (74)
The eigenvalues in the first and second bracket are negative whenwH/w < 1 and w∗H/w∗ <
1, which is satisfied when L/b > H¯ = H¯∗. The last two eigenvalues becomes negative
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when the coefficient of the second term is positive and that of the last term is positive.
Since the first bracket in the last term is −(1− φc)2m¯/∆2c , we have the following relation
∂(pic/Pint)
∂m
<
∂(pic/Pint)
∂m∗
. (75)
Then, the above condition can be written as
2
∂ ln(pic/Pint)
∂m
<
∂ ln(pic/Pint)
∂m
+
∂ ln(pic/Pint)
∂m∗
. (76)
Thus, the last two eigenvalues are negative when
∂ ln(pic/Pint)
∂m
+
∂ ln(pic/Pint)
∂m∗
< 0⇔ 0 < b− (1− φint)/(1 + φint) (77)
. Since 0 < φint < 1 and b > 1, the last two eigenvalues are always negative.
B.5.
The zero profit condition for upstream firms implies w∗H = (2L−H∗)/[(b− 1)H∗]. Since
wH is less than one when entrepreneurs are abundant, we have 2L/b < H¯∗.
Setting n = 0,m∗ = 0, w∗/w = 1 and pic/Pint = 1, the Jacobian matrix can be
written as
J =

m¯
∂ ln(pic/Pint)
∂m
m¯
∂ ln(pic/Pint)
∂m∗
m¯
∂ ln(pic/Pint)
∂n
m¯
∂ ln(pic/Pint)
∂n∗
0 ln(pi∗c/P
∗
int) 0 0
0 0 H¯ ln(wH/w) 0
nˆ∗
∂ ln(w∗H/w
∗)
∂m
nˆ∗
∂ ln(w∗H/w
∗)
∂m∗
nˆ∗
∂ ln(w∗H/w
∗)
∂n
nˆ∗
∂ ln(w∗H/w
∗)
∂n∗

. (78)
The characteristic equation of the system can be written as
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(
λ− ln( pi
∗
c
P ∗int
)
)(
λ− H¯ ln(wH/w)
)×{[
λ− m¯∂ ln(pic/Pint)
∂m
] [
λ− n¯(H¯ − n¯)∂(w
∗/w)
∂n∗
]
−m¯∂ ln(pic/Pint)
∂n∗
n¯(H¯ − n¯)∂ ln(w
∗/w)
∂m
}
= 0 (79)
Using pic − Pint = 0, we have
pi∗c − P ∗int = n∗−
1
σint−1f
{
φ
− 1σint−1
int
(
φc +
1
φc
)
− 1
}
Since 0 < φint < 1, 1/φint becomes larger than one. From the inequality of the arithmetic
and geometric means, φc + 1/φc ≥ 2. Thus, we have pi∗c − P ∗int > 0. This means that the
first eigenvalue is always positive.
Since the wage rates of entrepreneurs in the region where there are no upstream firms
become wH = 1, using w = 1, we have wH/w = 1. Thus, the second eigenvalue is always
positive.
B.6.
The zero profit condition for upstream firms implies w∗H = (2L−H∗)/[(b− 1)H∗]. Since
wH is more than one when entrepreneurs are scarce, using n∗ = H¯∗, we have 2L/b ≥ H¯∗.
Settingm∗ = 0,n = 0 and n∗ = H¯ , the characteristic equation of the system can be written
as
(
λ− m¯∂ ln(pic/Pint)
∂m
)(
λ− H¯ ln(pi∗c/P ∗int)
)×
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(
λ− H¯ ln(wH/w)
) (
λ+ H¯ ln(w∗H/w
∗)
)
= 0 (80)
Since the wage rates of entrepreneurs in the region where there are no upstream firms be-
come wH = 1, using w = 1, we have wH/w = 1. Thus, the third eigenvalue is always
positive.
B.7.
From the abundant supply of entrepreneurs, we have wH = w = 1. Since the zero profit
condition for upstream firms implies wH = (2L − H)/[(b − 1)H], we have 2L/b < H¯ .
Settingm∗ = m, n > 0 and n∗ = 0, the Jacobian matrix can be written as
m¯
∂ ln(pic/Pint)
∂m
m¯
∂ ln(pic/Pint)
∂m∗
m¯
∂ ln(pic/Pint)
∂n
m¯
∂ ln(pic/Pint)
∂n∗
m¯∗
∂ ln(pi∗c/P
∗
int)
∂m
m¯∗
∂ ln(pi∗c/P
∗
int)
∂m∗
m¯∗
∂ ln(pi∗c/P
∗
int)
∂n
m¯∗
∂ ln(pi∗c/P
∗
int)
∂n∗
nˆ
∂ ln(wH/w)
∂m
nˆ
∂ ln(wH/w)
∂m∗
nˆ
∂ ln(wH/w)
∂n
nˆ
∂ ln(wH/w)
∂n∗
0 0 0 H ln(w∗H/w
∗)

. (81)
This system is stable when w∗H/w∗ > 1. Since wH = (2L − H)/[(b − 1)H] and wH =
W = 1, we have L/H = b/2. Thus, we have:
w∗H =
1
2
(φint + 1/φint).
From the inequality of the arithmetic and geometric means, w∗H > 1 is implied. Thus, this
system is not stable.
B.8.
The zero profit condition for upstream firms implies wH = (2L − H)/[(b − 1)H]. Since
wH > 1, we have 2L/b ≥ H¯ . Setting m = m∗, n = H¯ and n∗ = 0, the characteristic
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equation of the system can be written as
m¯
∂ ln(pic/Pint)
∂m
m¯
∂ ln(pic/Pint)
∂m∗
m¯
∂ ln(pic/Pint)
∂n
m¯
∂ ln(pic/Pint)
∂n∗
m¯∗
∂ ln(pi∗c/P
∗
int)
∂m
m¯∗
∂ ln(pi∗c/P
∗
int)
∂m∗
m¯∗
∂ ln(pi∗c/P
∗
int)
∂n
m¯∗
∂ ln(pi∗c/P
∗
int)
∂n∗
0 0 −H¯ ln(wH/w) 0
0 0 0 H¯ ln(w∗H/w
∗)

. (82)
The third and forth eigenvalues are negative when w∗H < 1 < wH . Hence, we have
1
2
<
L
bH
<
b(1 + φc)φint + (1− φint)φc
b(1 + φint)(1 + φc)− (1− φc)(1− φint) (83)
The inequality of the first and the third terms provide b < 1. The definition allows b > 1.
Thus, the third or forth eigenvalue is positive.
B.9.
Setting n∗ = n (= H¯ ,m > 0 andm = 0, the Jacobian matrix can be written as
J =

m¯
∂ ln(pic/Pint)
∂m
m¯
∂ ln(pic/Pint)
∂m∗
m¯
∂ ln(pic/Pint)
∂n
m¯
∂ ln(pic/Pint)
∂n∗
0 ln(pi∗c/P
∗
int) 0 0
nˆ
∂ ln(wH/w)
∂m
nˆ
∂ ln(wH/w)
∂m∗
nˆ
∂ ln(wH/w)
∂n
nˆ
∂ ln(wH/w)
∂n∗
nˆ∗
∂ ln(w∗H/w
∗)
∂m
nˆ∗
∂ ln(w∗H/w
∗)
∂m∗
nˆ∗
∂ ln(w∗H/w
∗)
∂n
nˆ∗
∂ ln(w∗H/w
∗)
∂n∗

. (84)
The zero profit condition for downstream firms in the north implies that pic = Pint. Since
Pint = P ∗int, we have:
pi∗c − P ∗int = pi∗c − pic =
µ
σc
L
m
(
φc +
1
φc
− 2
)
.
From the inequality of the arithmetic and geometric means, we have φc + 1/φc > 2. Thus,
since pi∗/P ∗int > 1, an eigenvalue in this system is positive.
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B.10.
Setting m∗ = 0 and n = n∗ = H¯ , the characteristic equation of the system can be written
as
(
λ− m¯∂ ln(pic/Pint)
∂m
)(
λ− H¯ ln(pi∗c/P ∗int)
)×
(
λ+ H¯ ln(wH/w)
) (
λ+ H¯ ln(w∗H/w
∗)
)
= 0 (85)
The second eigenvalue is negative when pi∗c − P ∗int < 0. Since pic − Pint = 0, the profit of
downstream firms in the south is written as
pi∗c − P ∗int = pi∗c − pic
=
µ
σc
L− H¯
m¯
(1− φc)
[
1− φc
φc
+
2(1− φint)
(b− 1)(1 + φint)
]
> 0. (86)
Thus, the second eigenvalue is positive.
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Figure 1: Sustainable condition of the core-periphery structure when entrepreneurs are
abundant
Figure 2: Sustainable condition of the core-periphery structure when entrepreneurs are
scarce b = 3, L = 1, H = 0.6,σint = 4
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